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Abstract
We advance and empirically test the idea that people on both the far right and 
far left will be more likely than political moderates to perceive the system as fair, 
as long as it serves their heightened needs for security. We argue that political 
extremists may be especially drawn to systems that offer certainty and security. 
As long as ideological extremists are not alienated from the political system in 
general, they will, therefore, be especially motivated to see the system as fair, in 
particular, if  extremism is coupled with a heightened need for security. We test 
this notion using data from Iceland, a country with a wide left–right spread in 
terms of  the political opinions of  both parties and people and which was, at 
the time of  the study, still reeling from an economic crisis that strongly affected 
political trust and threatened people’s sense of  security. We analyzed nationally 
representative data from the European Social Survey in 2012 (N = 752). The 
results showed a significant three-way interaction between political extremism, 
the need for security, and political trust in predicting perceived system fairness. 
The people most likely to perceive the system as fair were political extremists, 
with relatively high political trust and need for security. The results are discussed 
in light of  context effects and how people on the left and right might have 
higher needs for security with different threats in mind.
Keywords: system fairness; left–right extremism; need for security; political 
trust.
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Introduction
People who explicitly embrace political ideology on the fringes of  the political spectrum 
may have a complicated relationship with the general political system and authorities. 
Their relatively extreme political stance may be associated with detachment from the 
system, a system they perceive as far removed from their political vision. On the con-
trary, the adoption of  an extreme ideology can be associated with a strong engagement 
with politics and the system. Those who explicitly define their political views on the 
extremes are likely to adhere to a well-defined political system, such as libertarianism or 
communism. Regardless of  whether such political systems are to the left or the right, 
they are more likely than middle-ground compromises to offer clear and internally con-
sistent ideological packages for what constitutes a fair and prosperous society. Such 
ideologies have been shown to be especially appealing to those who have relatively high 
needs to manage uncertainty and threat (van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten & Eendbak 
2015) and are linked to an illusion of  understanding (Frenbach, Rogers, Fox & Sloman 
2013). When people embrace an ideology on the extremes, current governmental poli-
cies and decisions are typically not going to offer a good representation of  their opin-
ions and values. This is especially true in countries with coalition governments in which 
compromises between parties are unavoidable. The experience of  what could be labeled 
representational exclusion is potentially troublesome for people who have a relatively 
high need for security and yet have not become alienated from the political system. Sys-
tem justification theory (Jost & van der Toorn 2011) and the relational model of  justice 
(Tyler & Lind 1992) would predict that those people would be especially motivated to 
perceive authorities as fair and just. This is because, in this context, the system serves to 
meet their heightened needs for security. 
In this research, using representative data from Icelandic voters, we advance and 
empirically test the idea that people on the political extremes will be more likely than 
political moderates to perceive the system as fair, as long as they are not alienated from 
the political system in general and it serves their heightened needs for security.
1. Political ideology and the need for security
A great deal of  effort has gone into exploring how people on the political left and 
right differ from each other psychologically. Although the original work was done in 
the wake of  World War II (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford 1950), a 
2003 meta-analysis and theoretical integration by Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway 
revived the study of  ideology. In the paper, they put forward the uncertainty threat model 
of  political ideology that advanced the idea that people who embrace the conserva-
tive, or right-wing, ideology are motivated to do so in part because it serves their needs 
to manage their heightened sense of  uncertainty and threat. The model was based on 
a review of  160 studies showing that various measures indicative of  needs for order 
and structure, intolerance of  ambiguity and uncertainty, low integrative complexity, and 
closed-mindedness correlated positively with scores on various scales that either meas-






Jost & Thompson 2000; Sidanius & Pratto 1999; Wilson & Patterson 1968), as well as 
with voting preferences and right-wing (vs. left-wing) self-placement. The uncertainty 
threat model ignited a great deal of  interest in the topic, and researchers have continued 
to map psychological differences between conservatives and liberals, mostly confirming 
the model (Lammers & Proulx 2013; Napier & Jost 2008; Roccato, Vieno & Russo 2013; 
Schlenker, Chambers & Le 2012; van Lange, Bekkers, Chirumbolo & Leone 2011). 
Although the “rigidity of  the right” idea has dominated research on the psychol-
ogy of  ideology, the question has also been asked whether the relationship between 
ideology and needs to manage uncertainty and threat is always monotonously linear. 
A study comparing the psychological predictors of  the left–right ideology in several 
European countries found, for example, that “rigidity of  the right” was not the rule in 
former Communist countries (Thorisdottir, Jost, Leviatan & Shrout 2007). Malka and 
colleagues (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht & Lelkes 2014) found that across 51 nations, the high 
need for security and certainty was related to both right-wing self-placement and cultural 
attitudes, but, conversely, slightly related to left-wing economic attitudes. More pertinent 
to the current research are studies showing a curvilinear relationship in which political 
extremism on both the right and left is related to experienced uncertainty and threat 
(Fernbach, Rogers, Fox & Sloman 2013; van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten & Eendebak 
2015; Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno 2013)
An efficient way for people to reduce uncertainty is to root their beliefs and values 
in a world of  consensus. This can be achieved by selectively exposing themselves pri-
marily to people and information that share their view but also by subscribing to belief  
systems that are high in internal consistency. Political ideologies that are high in internal 
consistency are those that are clearly defined, comprehensive in scope, and often have 
(undisputed) authoritative texts or leaders. Such firm ideological convictions and belief  
systems that provide clear, comprehensive, and morally unambiguous political solutions 
are ideally suited to deal with feelings of  uncertainty and fear, as they make the world 
more understandable and manageable (Hogg, Kruglanski & Bos 2013; Kruglanski, 
Pierro, Mannetti & De Grada 2006).
Due to their “purity,” such ideologies tend to be associated with the political ex-
tremes, examples would be pure versions of  libertarianism and communism. Along 
those lines is recent research demonstrating that political extremism is associated with 
believing in simple political solutions with clear rights and wrongs, cognitive rigidity, 
closed-mindedness, and a tendency for extremists to seek out information about poli-
tics from their in-group and ignore or reject other positions (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox & 
Sloman 2013). This has led to the description of  extremists as having a “crippled ide-
ology” (Hardin 2002). Studies have also shown that, compared to moderates, political 
extremists are more susceptible to believing in conspiracy theories, which can at least 
be partially explained by their preference for simple solutions to societal problems (van 
Prooijen, Krouwel & Pollet 2015). 
Although political extremists are most frequently described as unthinking and rigid 
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with a lower capability for thinking integratively and a higher intolerance for ambiguity 
(McClosky & Chong 1985), research also reveals another view of  extremists (Brandt, 
Evans & Crawford 2014). This other view contrasts with the first one and contends that 
political extremists are more engaged and sophisticated in their political knowledge and 
attitudes compared to moderates (Brandt, Evans & Crawford 2014; Palfrey & Poole 
1987; Sidanius 1984, 1988; Sidanius & Lau 1989; van Hiel & Mervielde 2003; Zaller 
1992). 
This contrasting picture of  political extremists in the literature probably indicates 
that people can be drawn to extremism for different reasons. Some, even the majority, 
are drawn toward extreme ideologies because they fulfill their need for certainty by of-
fering an unambiguous and highly internally consistent belief  system. Others, however, 
may arrive at their extreme political positions via other routes, possibly driven by dissat-
isfaction with the current state of  politics. We would expect the latter to have a different 
relationship with authorities than the former, and this difference would be manifested 
in political trust.
2. Political trust
Political trust represents the degree to which people decide they can trust authorities not 
to abuse their power (Lühiste 2006). Psychologists define trust in authorities as based 
on beliefs and values, or “the belief  that authority shares the members’ fundamental 
values and will protect their interests” (De Cremer & Tyler 2007, 640). Political trust can 
be viewed as increasingly wide-reaching circles, the innermost being trust in politicians, 
followed by trust in the political regime, and, finally, trust in the community at large (e.g., 
van Ham & Thomassen 2014). Trust for the political community has been shown to 
be generally quite high and stable (e.g., Norris 2011), but other parts of  political trust 
are highly influenced by whether authorities represent one’s political opinion or not. 
Some scholars have even gone as far as to proclaim that political trust is solely driven 
by how much distance people see between themselves and the ruling parties (Newton 
1999). In addition, the divide between trust for different actors and levels of  the political 
system is not always clear. Fluctuations in political trust for the incumbents is generally 
not considered problematic given that this trust changes from one incumbent to the 
next. However, long-term low trust in incumbents could spill over to a lack of  trust in 
political institutions and, thus, undermine the political system (van Ham & Thomassen 
2014). These concerns are due to the fact that trust in political institutions is generally 
considered to be more vital for the functioning of  the political system and, specifically 
so, in democracies (Diamond 1999), and low trust for those indicates a need for system 
reform (van Ham & Thomassen 2014). 
Research has shown that low political trust is related to decreased voter turnout 
(Grönlund & Setäl 2007) and that it is one of  the main reasons people vote for extremist 
or populist parties (Hooghe, Marien & Pauwels 2011). This, however, does not indicate 
that all extremists have low political trust. As discussed above, extremists may arrive at 






lack of  trust in the current political system may push some toward extreme ideologies, 
and these we would expect to feel alienated from the political system more generally and 
to be unlikely to see it as a source of  security. Others, however, may be drawn to extreme 
ideologies because of  the high internal consistency and certainty they offer. We would 
not expect this latter group to be especially distrustful of  the political system. Research 
has shown trust to be correlated with judgments of  the fairness of  authorities, although 
the direction and nature of  this relationship are not clear (De Cremer & Tyler 2007).
3. Procedural fairness of the system
People judge the fairness of  authority by two major standards: distributive fairness and 
procedural fairness. Decisions about distributive fairness are based on whether people 
find their outcomes to be fair, which is usually based on an equity norm and compared 
to what others receive (Tyler 2000). Meeting people’s expectations for complete distribu-
tive justice can be difficult, if  not impossible, because in addition to material resources 
usually being limited, people have a strong tendency to exaggerate their contributions to 
groups and, thus, how big their share of  the outcome should be (Tyler 2000). Procedural 
fairness, however, is based on whether people see the decisions made by authorities as 
fairly decided upon (Tyler & Lind 1992; Tyler 2000). A key characteristic of  a fair pro-
cedure is that people are allowed to have a voice in the decision-making process. Other 
important characteristics are the perceived neutrality of  the decision maker, transpar-
ency, and the view that people are treated with dignity and respect (Tyler 2000). 
Although people care deeply about the fairness of  their outcomes, research has dem-
onstrated that fairness of  procedures may be even more important for people’s evalu-
ation of  authorities. Procedural fairness predicts, for example, people’s willingness to 
obey and cooperate with authorities (Tyler 1990; Tyler & Blader 2000; Tyler & Huo 
2002). The importance of  procedural fairness is good news for authorities because a 
fundamental difference between distributive justice and procedural justice is that fair de-
cision-making procedures is not a limited resource and that people are willing to accept 
unfavorable outcomes if  they perceive that they were determined using fair procedures 
(e.g., van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt & Wilke 1997). A relational model of  procedural jus-
tice explains why procedural fairness matters to people (Tyler & Lind 1992). According 
to the model, procedural justice is important because treatment by authorities conveys 
information about one’s standing and respect within a social group. Procedural fairness 
thus offers assurance that one is both accepted and valued by a group, which can reduce 
uncertainty and offer security if  the individual perceives the group as an important in-
group. 
4. Hypothesis 
Political extremists do not all have heightened security needs, but those who do will 
be especially motivated to perceive the political system as procedurally fair. This is not 
only because fair procedures tend to be predictable and, therefore, reduce the sense of  
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respect and inclusion, which is perhaps particularly important to a political extremist 
with high needs for security. This, however, will only hold true for those political ex-
tremists who see the political system and its agents as their in-group. Extremists who are 
low on political trust presumably neither see the system as a potential source for security 
and certainty nor as an important in-group by which to be valued. Therefore, extremists 
with little political trust would not be motivated to perceive procedural justice as high. 
We, therefore, hypothesize that an interaction will emerge between political extrem-
ism and the need for security in predicting perceived procedural fairness of  the system. 
Extremists with a high need for security will be the most likely of  all people to report 
high perceived procedural fairness of  authorities. Importantly, we also predict that this 
two-way interaction will be qualified by political trust, effectively turning our prediction 
into a fairly elaborate three-way hypothesis. In other words, we predict that a certain 
level of  political trust is necessary for the aforementioned two-way interaction between 
extremism and the need for security to appear. The extremists who do not trust the po-
litical system are not likely to see it as a potential security provider and, thus, will not be 
motivated to defend it. The reverse will be true for the extremists who have (relatively) 
high trust in the political system; for them, the system and its agents represent an in-
group, and those with high security needs will be especially motivated to see the system 
as fair and just toward all. Testing this hypothesis requires a political atmosphere that has 
large ideological differences between the left and the right (and thus, has extremism) and 
a good range in both trust and needs for security. 
5. Icelandic political landscape
In political discussions in Iceland, both the public and the elite frequently use the terms 
left and right. Accordingly, research has shown that the left–right dimension is quite 
clearly defined in the minds of  Icelandic voters and that it primarily revolves around at-
titudes toward capitalism and economic redistribution (Bengtsson, Hansen, Harðarson, 
Narud & Oscarsson 2014). Interestingly, people on the far left and right frequently share 
an opposition to Iceland joining the European Union (EU). Although the concerns are 
slightly different for those on the left versus the right, they agree that joining the union 
poses a grave threat to Iceland’s independence and sovereignty and that it poses a risk to 
the country’s cultural heritage (Bailes & Thorhallsson 2013).
Research based on election studies has shown that self-placement on the left–right 
scale in Iceland has remained remarkably stable since 1987 (the earliest comparable data 
available) with very few changes between surveys. On average, around 83% of  voters 
have been willing to place themselves on the left–right scale (0 to 10; 0 = left, 5 = mid-
dle, 10 = right), and the mean has hovered just above the center at 5.4, with around 28% 
of  respondents picking the middle option (Thorisdottir 2012; Thorisdottir, in press). 
The political system in Iceland is concisely described as a representative democracy 
and a parliamentary republic with a multiparty system. The pattern of  political parties 
has, for the most part, remained the same since the 1930s, with four major parties domi-






this time, with the occasional new party, the four-party pattern has continued to ree-
merge (Kristinsson 2007). Governments have always been formed by a coalition of  two 
or more political parties, as no single party has ever received the majority of  the votes. 
The Independence Party has been the only long-term party that is right of  center, 
and due to its ability to unite all voters right of  center regardless of  social class, it has for 
decades been the largest party and a dominant player in Icelandic politics. The left has 
been less cohesive, with parties merging and reemerging. In 2012 (the year the data for 
this study were collected), and still today, the socialist Left-Green Movement is furthest 
to the left of  the parties represented in the parliament, and the pro-EU Social Demo-
cratic Alliance closer to the middle. The Progressive Party, a former farmers’ party, is a 
relatively small center party with outsized political power due to its ability to form coali-
tion governments with both left- and right-wing parties. Historically, the Independence 
Party has received around 35% of  the national vote, followed by the Social Democratic 
Alliance (or its predecessors) with around 25%–30%, with the Left-Greens and the Pro-
gressive Party each receiving 10%–20% (Statistics Iceland n.d. b). 
At the time of  this study, the government was formed by a coalition of  the Left-
Green Movement and the Social Democratic Alliance, who won their largest election 
victory in 2009, the first election after the economic crisis in 2008. During the 12 years 
prior to the crisis, the government was mainly formed by a coalition of  the Independ-
ence Party and the Progressive Party. As a result, they and their policies were widely 
blamed for the crisis, and in the 2009 election, the Independence Party suffered a dra-
matic defeat. The fairly stable four-party political landscape has started to shift in the 
wake of  the political crisis following the economic one in 2008. Several smaller parties 
have entered the scene, two new parties (Bright Future and the Pirate Party) gained rep-
resentation in the 2013 parliamentary election, and party loyalty has been markedly re-
duced (Önnudóttir, Schmitt & Harðarson 2014). It has been noted that, in contrast with 
most neighboring countries, Iceland does not have an extremist right-wing party. Most 
extremist right-wing parties in Europe have been fueled by opposition to immigrants 
and immigration policies (Jagers & Walgrave 2007). Although around 8% of  Iceland’s 
population are immigrants (Statistics Iceland n.d. a), the issue has not been highly politi-
cized. Abundant employment opportunities and perceived ethnic and value similarities 
between native Icelanders and the largest group of  immigrants, Poles, probably goes far 
toward explaining this. 
The economic crisis of  2008 was followed by a political crisis in many European 
countries. Iceland was no exception (e.g.  Danielsson & Zoega 2009) as the economic 
crisis hit the country with dramatic force in October of  2008. The crisis was a severe 
threat to people’s sense of  security. During the first year of  the crisis, unemployment 
rose from 3.1% to 4.8%, mortgage debt grew dramatically due to the price indexing of  
mortgages, and there was a sense of  doom for the future of  Iceland as an independ-
ent nation when government debt was reported to be 50 billion euros, seven times the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of  the country. The crisis dramatically reduced trust 
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the parliament, for example, plummeted from 42% in 2007 to 13% in 2009 (Datamarket 
n.d.). It still remains low at 18% in 2015. The lack of  trust was also evident in changes 
in voting behavior. In the 2010 municipality election, the political parties that were per-
ceived as rebelling against the current system did well, whereas the establishment parties 
suffered defeat. This was clearly demonstrated in Reykjavík, where the semi-farcical Best 
Party was the undisputed winner of  the election. Election turnout has also suffered in 
the wake of  the crisis, especially in terms of  the municipal election, in which turnout fell 
from 78.7% in 2006 to 73.4% in 2010 and all the way down to 66.5% in 2014 (Statistics 
Iceland 2015). Although the crisis tested people’s faith in the system, the blame for the 
crisis was primarily put on the managers of  the banks and elected politicians but not on 
the basic tenets and institutions of  society, such as the courts or the police (Indridason, 
Önnudóttir, Thorisdottir & Hardarson 2013). 
Interestingly, the crisis in Iceland did not affect social trust. According to data from 
the European Social Survey, when people were asked whether “in general most people 




The data come from the sixth wave of  the European Social Survey in Iceland, which 
was conducted in 2012. The participants were from a random probability sample of  
1,431 with 752 valid interviews (53% response rate). All interviews were conducted face 
to face. The ages of  the participants ranged from 15 to 90 years, with a mean of  44.17 
years (SD = 18.69). There was almost an equal number of  males (n = 360) and females 
(n = 365).
6.2 Measures
In this study, we employed a three-item scale, tapping into the perception of  the proce-
dural aspect of  system fairness. Our three main independent variables were ideological 
extremism, the need for security, and trust, which was divided into political and general 
trust. The focus was on the interaction between extremism, the need for security, and 
political trust in predicting perceived system fairness. Other variables we adjusted for 
were whether the respondent voted for a government party in the last national election 
(2009 election, government parties: Social Democratic Alliance or Left Green Move-
ment); the respondent’s age, gender, education, and employment status; whether he or 
she lived in the capital; and whether he or she voted. 
System fairness. To measure the perception of  system fairness, we used three ques-
tion pairs in which the respondents were asked to rate each question on a scale from 
0–10 (therefore, an 11-point scale), first for the importance of  the item for democracy 
and, second, for performance on those items gauged by how well they apply in Iceland. 






• That the government explains its decisions to voters
• That the rights of  minority groups are protected
• That the courts treat everyone the same.
The response scales for importance ranged from 0 = not at all important to 10 = extreme-
ly important. For performance, the scale went from 0 = does not apply at all to 10 = applies 
completely. Table 1 shows that the three items were rated very high in importance, with 
a range of  means from 9.2 to 9.7. Ratings for performance were much lower, ranging 
from 4.6 to 6.6. As can be seen in Table 1, there was no correlation between importance 
and performance. 
A scale of  system fairness was then created by computing a weighted mean of  the 
three items for each respondent, such that for every participant, the perceived perfor-
mance on each item was weighted by its perceived importance. To achieve the weighting, 
the 0 to 10 importance rating was rescaled to go from 0 to 1 and then multiplied by the 
rated performance on the item. So, for example, if  a respondent assigned an importance 
of  5 to the protection of  minority group rights and an importance of  10 to the courts 
treating everyone the same, the former item was weighted by 0.5 and the latter by 1 
when computing the respondent’s mean on the scale for system fairness. By weighing, 
the perception of  system fairness scale takes into account that an item that is considered 
very important should weigh more in one’s perception of  system fairness compared to 
an item that is rated as less important. 
Table 1. Importance and performance of system justification factors
Performance Importance Pearson r 
CorrelationMean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
In country the government explains its 
decisions to voters 4,6 2,6 9,2 1,2 -,01
In country the rights of minority groups 
are protected 5,9 2,2 9,2 1,4 ,03
In country the courts treat everyone 
the same 6,6 2,9 9,7 1,0 ,06
Cronbach’s alpha ,71
Ideology. To measure ideological extremism, we used respondents’ self-placement on 
the left–right scale. To capture extremism, the variable was centered around the mean 
and then squared. As can be seen in Figure 1, left–right placement had almost a sym-
metrical bell-shaped curve, with little over one-third placing themselves in the middle, 
about one in every 10 to the immediate left or the right of  the center, and gradually 
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Figure 1. Respondents’ self-placement on a left–right scale, % (N=701)
Figure 2 shows the relation between left–right self-placement and the scale of  perceived 
system fairness. There was no apparent linear or curvilinear trend for ideological self-
placement. What is noteworthy in the figure is that the people on the left seemed to give 
all system fairness items a similar rating, with the exception of  those on the very end of  
the scale, whether for people on the right there was a fairly large difference between per-
ceived equality of  treatment by the courts (high) and how well the government explains 




























0 Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right 
In country the government explains its decisions to voters - weighted by importance 
In country the rights of  minority groups are protected - weighted by importance 
In country the courts treat everyone the same - weighted by importance 



















Need for security. As a measure of  respondents’ need for security, we used two state-
ments from the ESS that were a part of  the Schwartz (1992) Personal Values Ques-
tionnaire. The respondents were asked, on a six-point scale, how alike they were to the 
people described in the following two statements:
• It is important to him/her to live in secure surroundings. He/she avoids any-
thing that might endanger his/her safety. (Personal security)
• It is important to him/her that the government ensures his/her safety against 
all threats. He/she wants the state to be strong so that it can defend its citizens. 
(Government security)
Figure 3 shows that there was a relationship between the need for government safety 
and the need for personal safety. While a correlation of  .30 is of  medium strength, it 
still tells us that those who score high on personal security were more likely to score 
high on institutional security. In our regression models, therefore, we used a composite 
measure of  personal and government security by taking the mean of  both items for each 
respondent and rescaling to range from 0 (not like me at all) to 1 (very much like me) to 
simplify the interpretation of  the results. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the 
need for security and left–right placement. There seems to be a slight curvilinear trend, 
where those furthest to the left and the right were more likely to score high on the need 
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0 Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right 
Important to live in secure and safe surroundings - means 
Important that government is strong and ensures safety - means 














Figure 4. Need for security and left–right self-placement
Political trust. Political trust was measured with three questions asking about trust in 
the parliament, political parties, and politicians. All questions were on an 11-point scale, 
from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). The correlations between the three ques-
tions were high, with Pearson’s r ranging from .72 to 85, and their Cronbach’s alpha was 
.91 (Table 2), indicating that all three of  them were measuring the same latent construct. 
We use those three questions to calculate a scale for political trust, using respondents’ 
means score on the three items.1 
Table 2. Correlation and reliability statistics for trust for parliament, political 
parties, and politicians
Trust in  
parliament
Trust in  
political parties
Trust in  
politicians
Trust in parliament
Trust in political parties .72***
Trust in politicians .75*** .85***
Cronbach’s alpha for the three trust items: ,91
*Correlation entries are Pearson’s r
Figure 5 shows the means, from left to right respondents’ self-placement, for each of  the 
three items, as well as the mean scale for political trust. Although there was no apparent 






tween the three measures of  political trust were larger on the left compared to the right. 
This may have been caused by the fact that at the time of  the survey, the incumbent gov-
ernment was left-wing (Social Democratic Alliance and Left-Green Movement). Thus, 
left-wing voters may have expressed greater trust for the parliament because their party 
was in government. We control for this possible bias, caused by the fact that the vot-
ers’ preferred party is in government—referred to as a winners-and-losers’ effect (e.g. 
Holmberg 1999)—by including in our models whether the respondents’ preferred party 














































0 Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right 
Trust in parliament - means Trust in politicians - means 













Figure 5. Political trust and left–right self-placement
Because we hypothesized about a three-way interaction between extremism, the need 
for security, and political trust, we also examined the bivariate relation between the need 
for security and political trust (Figure 6). The pattern in the figure indicates a slight 
curvilinear trend, where those that had a high and low need for security scored lower on 
political trust compared to other respondents. 
Adjustment variables. To adjust for a more general tendency to trust others, we 
adjusted for social trust, measured by the question asking whether most people can be 
trusted or whether one cannot be too careful, with a response scale from 0 (you cannot 
be too careful) to 10 (most people can be trusted).3 
As previously mentioned, we also adjusted for whether the respondent voted for a 
government party or not. Other variables that have been found to predict system sup-
port (e.g., Anderson and Singer 2008), and which we included in the model, were the 
respondent’s age, gender, education, employment status; whether he or she lives in the 
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Need for security 
Figure 6. Political trust and the need for security4
6.3 Regression models
To test our hypotheses that a three-way interaction between ideological extremism, 
needs for security, and political trust will predict perceived system fairness, we ran an 
OLS regression in four steps (Table 3). 
In step one, when entering only the main effects of  the need for security and ideol-
ogy (both linear and curvilinear to capture the extremism effect) in addition to adjust-
ment variables, none were statistically significant. The trust variables were added in step 
two, both resulting in a positive significant effect on perceived system fairness. In step 
three, we added all the two-way interaction effects, but the main test of  the hypothesis 
of  the study was the three-way interaction between left–right extremism, the need for 






Table 3. Perception of system fairness, OLS regressions
1 step 2 step 3 step 4 step
B B B B
(std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.)
Left-right centered ,05 ,05 ,24 ,18
(.049) (.043) (.172) (.352)
Left-right extremism (curvilinear) ,02 ,01 ,04 .21+
(.015) (.013) (.058) (.109)
Need for security (government) -,04 .71+ -,82 ,24
(.437) (.393) (.898) (1.027)
Political trust .35*** ,02 ,22
(.042) (.135) (.165)
General trust .24*** .24*** .24***
(.043) (.043) (.043)
Security*political trust .47* ,17
(.197) (.244)
Left-right centered*security -,13 -,07
(.200) (.472)
Left-right curv.*security -,07 -.30*
(.071) (.148)
Left-right centered*political trust -,03 -,02
(.018) (.075)
Left-right curv.*political trust ,00 -.04+
(.006) (.025)
Left-right cen.*need for sec.*political trust ,01
(.104)
Left-right curv.*need for sec.*political trust .07*
(.035)
Age .01* .01* .02* .02**
(.006) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Education (reference=primary)
Secondary ,47 ,26 ,24 ,29
(.325) (.289) (.290) (.290)
Vocational -,11 -,16 -,18 -,20
(.254) (.225) (.226) (.225)
University .48* ,13 ,09 ,11
(.231) (.208) (.208) (.208)
Unemployed ,30 ,33 ,36 ,42
(.585) (.519) (.517) (.516)
Capital area -.32+ -.47** -.50** -.51**
(.187) (.167) (.166) (.166)
Male ,22 .48** .45** .44**
(.182) (.164) (.164) (.164)
Voted for incumbent government party ,05 -,08 -,07 -,04
(.215) (.191) (.191) (.190)
Voted  ,41 ,20 ,29 ,29
(.301) (.268) (.269) (.269)
Constant, sig.value ,000 ,003 ,001 ,025
R sq. ,03 ,24 ,26 ,26
R sq. change, sig. value ,210 ,000 ,060 ,095
N 508
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Figures 7 and 8 display the three-way interaction, or, more precisely, how the two-way 
interaction between extremism and the need for security depends on the level of  politi-
cal trust. Figure 7 shows those who report a low level of  political trust (-1.5 st.dev.) for 
different levels on the need for security (-/+ 1.5 st.dev.) and extremism. Figure 8 shows 
the same, but for high trust. Looking first at the two-way interaction when trust was low 
(Figure 7), it is apparent that extremism had the opposite effects on perceived system 
fairness, depending on whether people had a low (light gray line) or high need (dark gray 
line) for security. When the need for security was low and political trust was low, political 
extremists perceived the system as more fair compared to moderates. This was especially 
true for extremists on the right, which possibly indicates that this pattern is mostly rep-
licating the well-known finding that people on the right have a stronger tendency than 
those on the left to perceive the system as fair and just. Interestingly, when the need for 
security was high and trust was low, extremists perceived the system as less fair com-
pared to moderates. This could indicate that those extremists who have a high need for 
security but low trust in the political system are especially disillusioned by the system 
because they do not perceive it to provide them with the security and certainty they are 
motivated to find. This is supported by the findings for high political trust reported in 
Figure 8. There, displayed by the dark gray line, we see a reverse pattern for extremists 
who had a high need for security but high political trust. This line shows that political 
extremists who have a high need for security and also trust the political system are more 
likely to perceive the system as fair, thereby confirming the main hypothesis of  the study. 
The hypothesis receives added support by the fact that the average predicted value for 
system fairness among political extremists is by far the highest we see in the data, sup-
porting the reasoning that this group of  people may be especially motivated to perceive 
the system as fair because it serves as an important source of  security and certainty. For 
people who are high on trust but low on security, there seems to be a weak relationship 
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7. Discussion
This study has been the first to show that a curvilinear relationship exists between po-
litical orientation and perceived system fairness when certain psychological conditions 
are met. Namely, when those on the far ends of  the political spectrum have both rela-
tively high political trust and a strong need for security, they become especially likely to 
perceive the system as fair. This was demonstrated using nationally representative data 
from Iceland which were collected in 2012, a few years after a dramatic economic crisis 
that shook citizens’ sense of  security and their trust in authorities. The results held when 
adjusted for social trust, whether the respondent had voted for a governmental party, 
and a few other demographic variables previously shown to matter in similar analyses. 
The findings speak directly to a body of  literature that has emerged in the last few 
years on the psychology of  extremism (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox & Sloman 2013; van 
Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten & Eendebak 2015; Toner, Leary, Asher & Jongman-Sereno 
2013). This literature has demonstrated that political extremists on the left and right 
have some psychological characteristics in common that differentiate them from politi-
cal moderates. This does not mean that the “rigidity of  the right” hypothesis is necessar-
ily false. It could mean that although people who are motivated to manage uncertainty 
and threat are more likely to find “elective affinities” with the right-wing or conservative 
ideology (Jost, Federico & Napier 2009), they may also do so on the left, especially in 
societies in which left-wing and right-wing ideologies reach far from the center.
Espousing political views outside the mainstream has psychological antecedents and 
consequences. Whether your views are on the right because you strongly believe in the 
laws of  the free market or on the left because you would like much more radical meas-
ures put in place to guarantee equality of  income, being drawn to a comprehensive and 
internally consistent ideological system may, in both cases, partially meet a need for cer-
tainty and security. What is very probable, however, is that people with heightened needs 
for security are looking for ways to meet their security and certainty needs beyond what 
an ideology can offer. These needs will presumably be fulfilled in different ways on the 
left and right. A high need for security in the left domain may manifest itself  in the desire 
for a strong welfare system that protects and provides for all citizens, regardless of  their 
capabilities and social standing (Malka & Soto 2014). On the right, however, the need 
for safety will more likely pertain to security from crime, terrorism, and other forms of  
disturbances to the social order (Jost et al. 2003). 
Even if  not a part of  what was hypothesized in this study, it is noteworthy that both 
political trust and the need for security had direct positive effects on perceived system 
fairness. This indicates that those who express greater political trust and have a higher 
need for security are more likely to perceive the system as fair. The finding that for polit-
ical extremes, the effect of  the need for security on system fairness is conditioned by 
political trust further underlines the importance of  political trust as a stabilizing factor 
both for the political extremes and for democracy. This is even more important given 






these circumstances, having relatively high political trust offers an assurance that the 
authorities will not abuse their power.
The relationship of  interest in this study is admittedly a complicated one as it de-
scribes a three-way interaction. Future studies on the topic would ideally be able to 
further explore the psychological factors that extremists have in common, especially as 
they pertain to the needs for security and certainty. In this study, we followed research-
ers within political psychology and operationalized political extremism as self-reported 
distance from the midpoint on the one-dimensional left–right scale (e.g., van Prooijen, 
Krouwel, Boiten & Eendebak 2015). Of  course, this is a highly simplified measure of  
ideological extremism as it is relative and tells us nothing about the contents of  the 
ideology, political sophistication, or strength of  attitudes. For our understanding of  po-
litical extremism to advance, an imminent next step in this line of  work is to dive into 
the contents of  the ideologies held by people on the extreme ends of  the scale. The de-
pendent measure of  perceived system fairness should also be scrutinized. Our method 
of  constructing a three-item scale of  system fairness based on how well people think 
the government explains its decisions to voters, that the rights of  minority groups are 
protected, and that the courts treat everyone the same resulted in an acceptable alpha 
but not an exceptionally high one. We also saw in Figure 2 that the level of  agreement 
on performance on those items (weighted by importance) differed substantially across 
the left–right continuum in a somewhat unpredictable fashion. This may suggest that 
the items are not equally good measures of  system fairness for people of  all political 
leanings.
One of  the other questions that remain to be answered is whether the three-way 
interaction between ideological extremism, the need for security, and political trust is 
particular to Iceland. More narrowly, perhaps the results would only emerge in Iceland 
due to the peculiar dynamics set in motion following the economic and political crisis 
of  2008. A counter argument would be that there is no obvious reason to assume that 
the crisis affected those on the ideological extremes, concerning their need for secu-
rity, differently compared to the moderates. Furthermore, there are no indicators that 
Icelanders have become more polarised after the crash. What we see is that people have 
lost faith in representative institutions, such as the parliament and traditional political 
parties, a phenomenon that is hardly unique to Iceland. In Iceland, this loss of  trust and 
legitimacy has opened up space for new parties to gain representation. These new par-
ties do not subscribe to extreme ideologies but are politically moderate (Bright Future) 
or have taken pains to define themselves outside of  the left–right dimension (Pirate 
Party). Whether we will find the same relationship as has been reported here in other 
countries is an empirical question that is waiting to be tested. Such a replication will 
be relatively straightforward as the data employed in this study, from the sixth wave 
of  the European Social Survey, are available from close to 30 European countries. In 
pursuing this question, it would probably be necessary to take into account the different 
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paper, we have established the importance of  taking into account the level of  political 
trust when examining the effect of  the political extremes and their need for security on 
system fairness. Those who place themselves on the extremes and have a high need for 
security only perceive the system as fair when they trust it. In this way, political trust can 
compensate for the loss of  representation on the extremes. 
This research is part of  the Icelandic Power and Democracy Research Project (2014-2017).  For fur-
ther information on the research project see: www.vol.hi.is 
Notes
1  Pearson r correlation between system fairness and political trust is .41.
2  A total of  19 respondents place themselves on the far right end point of  10, and 23 placed them-
selves at 9. A total of  28 respondents placed themselves on the far left, 14 on 0, and 14 on 1.
3  General trust correlates modestly with the three items on political trust, ranging from Pearson r = 
.27 (with political parties) to .35 (with parliament).
4  The number of  reponses from 0 to 0.2 (first three points) are 26 (0 = 2, 0.1 = 8 and 0.2 = 15). 
Combining these three points results in a mean score of  3.9 on political trust.
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